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Spring 2001

ALL'S O.K. BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS:
ENLIGHTENED RULE ON PRIVACY, OBSCENE
RULE ON ETHICS
Lawrence J. Fox:*

I. INTRODUCTION

We are blessed to live in "interesting times." Those of us who have
labored long in the ethics vineyard have observed with surprise as the

issues relating to the professional responsibility of lawyers have evolved
from topics which were addressed, if at all, at mandatory continuing
legal education seminars to fulfill some "damn" state supreme court's

* Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath; Adjunct Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. B.A., LL.B., University of Pennsylvania.
This Article was written to reflect the contents of the Lichtenstein Lecture %hich I was
honored to deliver on October 18, 2000, at Hofstra University School of Law. Before delivering
the substance of the speech. I had the privilege of recognizing both John Dewitt Gregory. the
Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, at Hofstra University School of
Law, who was my first "boss" at Community Action for Legal Services, and the remarkable ethics
"tag team" at the Hofstra University School of Law, which includes Professors Monre H.
Freedman, a Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, and Roy D. Simon, Jr.,
who have made the Hofstra Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics a leading force in the
professional responsibility world by sponsoring symposia and publications that have shaped the
debate in the profession for years. I particularly noted the extraordinary lifetime of work by
Professor Freedman, who has been a beacon for all of us who believe our ethical values are not
something to be compromised because of discomfort, expediency, or the eroding forces of the
marketplace. I dedicate this Article to Professors Freedman, Simon. and Gregory. three of my
professional heroes. Hofstra University School of Law is blessed to have all three and to share
their talents with the rest of our legal professional world.
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ethics education requirement,' until today, when, not only has the law

governing lawyers been the subject of a multi-volume restatement
published in August by the American Law Institute, but also the topic
of great debates in the policy-making bodies of many bar associations,'
articles in the popular press,4 and programs that are attended by lawyers
voluntarily because they are genuinely concerned with where the

profession is going and how their clients will be protected in the future."
1. See, e.g., Fla. Bar R. 6-10 (2001) (mandating five hours of ethics and professionalism
every three years); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1500.22(a) (1995-1999) (requiring
attorneys to complete four hours of ethics and professionalism every two years); N.C. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 27, r. ID.1518(a)-(b) (Nov. 2000) (requiring lawyers to complete two hours of ethics
every year plus three consecutive hours of ethics every three years); PA. R. CT. 105 (mandating
continuing legal education in ethics each year for every active lawyer).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). The Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers' adoption generated its own controversies. Compare
William T. Barker, Lobbying and the American Law Institute: The Example of Insurance Defense,
26 HoFrsRA L. REV. 573, 579, 582, 586-89, 593 (1998) (finding nothing wrong with lawyers
within the American Law Institute influencing the language of section 215 on behalf of the
insurance industry), with Lawrence J. Fox, Leave Your Clients at the Door,26 HOFSTRA L. REV.
595, 605-12, 614 (1998) (describing in a negative light the group of lawyers within the American
Law Institute who influenced language in section 215 to benefit clients in the insurance industry).
3. Multidisciplinary practice ("MDP") is a current source of debate amongst bar
associations. MDPs are practices that "involve different professionals, such as lawyers,
accountants and engineers, practicing together and sharing fees and control of the enterprise,"
Nicholas J. Zoogman, If Lawyers Practicein MDPs: Anticipate ProfoundEffects on Malpractice
Insurance Policies, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8, 2001, at 7. The Philadelphia Bar Association adopted a proMDP resolution. See Jeff Blumenthal, Bar Association Tackles Difficult Issues in 2000, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 28, 2000, at 1, available at WL, News Library, LEGALNP File. The
Pennsylvania Bar Association rejected a similar proposal. See Jeff Blumenthal, PBA Gives Thumbs
Down to MDP Proposal,LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 2000, at S4, available at WL, News
Library, LEGALNP File. The New York Bar Association rejected MDPs, but adopted proposals to
regulate side-by-side arrangements between service providers. See Zoogman, supra. The
opposition of the Ohio Bar Association, the Illinois Bar Association, the New Jersey Bar
Association, and the Florida Bar Association to MDPs formed the basis for the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") rejection of fee-sharing proposals. See id.; see also Wendy Davis, ABA
Delegates Reject MDPs, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 12, 2001, at 1, available at WL, News
Library, LEGALNP File.
4. See, e.g., John Malpas, Are MDPs the Way Forward?,TIMES (London), Nov. 30, 1999,
at 17 (discussing rejection of MDPs by representatives of bar associations throughout Europe)
Catherine Reagor, Bar OKs Mixture of Law, Biz, ARIz. REPUBLIC, May 23, 2000, at DI
(describing approval of MDPs by the State Bar of Arizona). The popular press has also devoted
much attention to the ABA's rejection of MDPs. See, e.g., Stephanie Franken, To MDP or Not to
MDP: The QuestionIs at the Heartof a Hot Debate in the Legal Profession, PiTr. POST-GAzETE,
Aug, 31, 2000, at Fl; John Malpas, American Bar Votes Down Union, TIMES (London), July 25,
2000, at 17; Dan Margolies, BarAssociation Bans Partnershipswith Nonlawyer Firms: Individual
States May Still Authorize the Practice, KAN. CrrY STAR, July 18, 2000, at D20; Tunku
Varadarajan, Why Is the ABA Afraid of a Little Competitionfor Lawyers?, VALL ST. J., July 24,
2000, at A27.
5. See generally Remarks at the ABA Annual Meeting (July 8, 2000) (providing
PresidentialShowcase: May It Please the Court, I am from Arthur Price & Deloitte: MDP's,
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Of course, this attention to ethics is not necessarily an unmixed
blessing. Ethics is au courant today in part because fundamental
principles are under attack, from both within the profession and from
without. This Article addresses yet one more fundamental issue that the
Author is dismayed to predict may well become a centerpiece of the
ethics debate over the next few years.
The discussion begins with what might seem to be a relatively
insignificant matter. A client goes to a major law firm, perhaps one of
the great law firms in Gotham. The client says to the law firm, "I would
love to hire you." The law firm is flattered that the client wants to hire
the it; the firm happily announces, "Yes, we will be glad to do the work
that you have requested. We will send you our standard retention letter."
The client receives the standard retention letter and, unlike the practice
in the past when there was no retention letter,' or only a perfunctory
single-page confirmation of engagement, 7 this retention letter is quite
lon--maybe not quite as long as the fine print governing airline
liability for lost luggage, but quite lengthy nonetheless. Buried in it is a
clause which says that the law firm is free to take on any matters against
the client in the future, so long as the matter the law firm is taking on is
not substantially related to the work the law firm is currently
undertaking for the client. In other words, the firm proclaims to the
client, "We are really happy to take you on, but we want you to
understand that what we give with one hand, we take with the other."
The Author has always been shocked by the chutzpah of a law firm
greeting a new client and saying, "We would love to represent you, we
are lawyers, we are professionals, but let us remind you that we have
this little clause buried on page three of our five-page, single-spaced
letter of retention."

Should Trial Lai.ers Care?); MultidisciplinaryPractice, What It Is and M~zat It Means to the

Vermont Practitioner,Vermont Bar Association, Young Lawyers Section. Jan. 14, 2000; Pro &
Con: Shwuld the PA BarEmbrace MDP?, PA House of Delegates, Oct. 29, 1999; MDP: Should
In-House Counsel Care?, Corporate Counsel Committee of Business Law Section of the ABA.
San Diego, Oct. 25, 1999; Remarks at the New Jersey State Bar Association Annual Meeting (May
14, 1999) (providing The Challenge of MultidisciplinaryPractice:Will It Change the Face of Lm.
Practice?).
6. See generally JAY G. FOONBERG, HOW To START AND BUILD A LAW PRAncrcE 283 (3d
ed. 1991) (stating the previously accepted view against the need for written agreements Ht een
lawyers and clients).
7. See, e.g., id. at 57-58 (providing an example of a short retention form used by lawyers in
the 1970s); KAY OSTBERG, USING A LAWYER ...

AND WHAT TO DO IF THINGS GO WVRO: A

STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE 91-98 (rev. ed. 1990) (offering a more recent model of a significantly longer
retention agreement).
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While the use of such letters should be the source of great

disillusionment, one could always take some comfort that most
assuredly these provisions were unenforceable, not worth the paper on
which they were written.8 This did not mean that some clients would not
be hoodwinked by unsavory lawyers into acquiescing in these

waivers-both at the time of retention, and again when the law firm
relied on the earlier waiver to take on an otherwise conflicting
representation that the client, if asked contemporaneously, would never
have waived. However, the fact that the waiver did not identify the
potentially conflicting representation meant that the consent of the
client at the time the prospective waiver was sought could hardly be
considered informed, a fundamental ethical requirement for any waiver

of a conflict of interest, whether prospective9 or contemporaneous. t "
Thus, at least those clients who were knowledgeable and fortified

enough to challenge these prospective waivers were not injured by
them, except to the extent they had to spend time and money litigating
their validity.
II.

A.

PROSPECTIVE WAIVERS

Prospective Waivers Under FormalOpinion 372

This significant limitation on the efficacy of prospective waivers

received one of its better expressions in a formal opinion issued by the
American Bar Association ("ABA") Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility ("ABA Committee")." The ABA
Committee began its analysis with a review of the requirements for
8. See ROY D. SIMON, JR. & MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: CASES AND MATERIALS 341-42 (3d ed. 1994) (stating that lawyers cannot rely with
certainty on any written waivers obtained from clients).
9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7 (2001) (requiring client consent
after consultation before a lawyer may represent a client whose interests are directly adverse to
another client's interests or before representing a client whose "representation ... may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client").
10. See, e.g., id. (requiring client consent after consultation before a lawyer may represent a
client whose interests are directly adverse to another client's interests or before representing a
client whose "representation ... may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client").

11. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 372 (1993) (providing
that "if [a] waiver is to be effective with respect to a future conflict, it must contemplate that
particular conflict with sufficient clarity so [that] the client's consent can reasonably be viewed as

having been fully informed when it was given"). The Author admits the text characterization Is
self-serving since he was the principal draftsman of this opinion.
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contemporaneous waivers."2 Noting that contemporaneous waivers may
be primarily sought from present clients because the client being asked
to waive a conflict knows "two important pieces of information: (1) the
subject matter of the adverse representation, and (2) the character of
confidential information that the client has [already] disclosed to the
lawyer in the course of the existing representation,"' 3 the ABA
Committee reminded the profession that client "consent after
consultation"' 4-the requirement found in Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") for seeking waivers'!--was
defined in the Terminology Section of the Model Rules as a
"'communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the
client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question."""
The opinion then recalled two cases that provided "useful guidance
[to the profession] as to what disclosure is necessary to make the
client's consent to a [present] conflict effective."" In FinancialGeneral
Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger," the district court defined "full disclosure"
under Disciplinary Rule 5-105(c) of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility as the "affirmative revelation by the attorney of all the
facts, legal implications, possible effects, and other circumstances
relating to the proposed representation. A client's mere knowledge of
the existence of his attorney's other representation does not alone
constitute full disclosure."' 9 Similarly, in Rogers v. Robson, Masters,
Ryan, Brumund & Belom," the Illinois Appellate Court held that full
disclosure for waiver of a present conflict must include "all facts and
circumstances which in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill and
capacity, are necessary to enable his client to make a free and intelligent
decision regarding the representation."'"
Turning then to prospective waivers, the ABA Committee's
opinion addressed the following question: Since informed consent was
also required for these non-contemporaneous waivers, how could that
12. See idL
13. Id.
14. Id

15. See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7(a)(2) (providing that a la%3cr cannot
represent a client if representation "wiI be directly adverse to another client." unless the client
"consents after consultation").
16. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 372 (quoting M1el
Rule 1.7).
17. Id.
18. 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981).
19. Id. at771.
20. 392 N.E.2d 1365 (I1. App. Ct. 1979), aff'd. 407 N.E.2d 47 (Il.19801.
21. Id at 1371.
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requirement be fulfilled in this circumstance?' The ABA Committee
concluded that a prospective waiver "which did not identify either the
potential opposing party [i.e., the other client for whom the law firm
planned to take on a matter in the future] or at least a class of potentially
conflicting clients" was unlikely to be efficacious."3 But the ABA
Committee did not stop there. It continued:
Even that information might not be enough if the nature of the likely
matter and its potential effect on the client were not also appreciated
by the client at the time the prospective waiver was sought. For
example, a prospective waiver from a client bank allowing its lawyer
to represent future borrowers of the bank could not reasonably be
viewed as permitting the lawyer to bring a lender-liability or a RICO
action against the bank, unless the prospective waiver explicitly
identified such drastic claims.24
The ABA Committee observed:
The closer the lawyer who seeks a prospective waiver can get to
circumstances where not only the actual adverse client but also the
actual potential future dispute are identified, the more likely it will be
that a prospective waiver is consistent with the requirement of the
Model Rules that consent be attended by a consultation that
communicates "information reasonably sufficient to permit the client
to appreciate the significance of the matter in question." '
The ABA Committee then warned that the difficulty of placing a client
in a position in which the client would "be able to recognize the legal
implications and possible effects of the future representation at the time
the [prospective] waiver is signed" only highlighted "the substantial
26
burden that those seeking enforceable prospective waivers must meet.
Finally, the ABA Committee addressed the issue of whether
prospective waivers could ever be viewed as consent to the use of client
confidential information, recognizing at the outset that any waiver of the
latter must be as fully informed as a prospective waiver of a conflict. 7
Since, at the time the prospective waiver is sought, neither the client nor
the lawyer will "have or could have an[y] understanding" of what
confidential information will yet be shared in the representation, the

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 372.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Model Rules Terminology).
Id.
See id.
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ABA Committee concluded that "a client's prospective waiver of
conflicts cannot be presumed to waive objection to disclosure or use of
confidential client information subject to Rule 1.6."'
The ABA Committee's closing observation on prospective waivers
was designed to provide cautionary instructions.
Given the foregoing analysis, one principle seems certain: no
lawyer can rely with ethical certainty on a prospective waiver of
objection to future adverse representations simply because the client
has executed a written document to that effect. No lawyer should
assume that without more, the "coast is clear" for undertaking any and
all future conflicting engagements that come within the general terms
of the waiver document. Even though one might think that the very
purpose of a prospective waiver is to eliminate the need to return to the
client to secure a "present" second waiver when what was once an
inchoate matter ripens into an immediate conflict, there is no doubt
that in many cases that is what will be ethically required.-'
At the present time, the law governing prospective waivers
conforms with the reasoning of the ABA Committee's opinion. The
district court in Schwartz v. IndustrialValley Title Insurance Co." held
28. I& Westinghwuse Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978h.
demonstrates the important principle that courts are unwilling to conclude that a client has vaived
his or her right to keep privileged communications confidential. See idLat 229. Westinghouse
Electric Corp. ("Westinghouse") instituted a uranium price-fixing action against both Gulf Oil
Corp. ("Gulf') and United Nuclear Corp. ("United"). See id. at 222. The latter sought to b2
represented in the Westinghouse litigation by a Santa Fe firm that had been engaged previously to
represent Gulf on a number of occasions in connection with Gulf's largest supply of uranium ore
reserves in New Mexico. See iULat 222-23. Gulf sought to disqualify United's counsel on the basis
of this prior representation and the fact that while the two entities were co-defendants United
would seek to exculpate itself by implicating Gulf. See id. at 223. The lower court denied the
motion, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, addressing, among other issues, the claim by United that
Gulf had prospectively waived any conflict between them on as many as three different oz-casions.
See id. at 223, 227-28, 229. Recognizing that this proposition was bottomed on the client
authorizing a lawyer to use confidential information against the client, the court noted:
[MHe [the former client] would thus willingly and freely consent, apparently without the
slightest objection or hesitancy, to furnish his adversaries in this very same litigation
with weapons with which to contest, and, possibly defeat, his valuable rights... is ...
almost unworthy of credence.... Ordinary experience teaches us that men endowed
with the ordinary business sense and experience do not enter into such remarkable and
prejudicial engagements.
Id. at 228-29 (quoting In re Boone, 83 F.2d 944, 956 (N.D. Cal. 1897)) (alterations in originalI.
The court then held that "consent to the mere representation of a client with adverse interests does
not amount to either consent to breach of confidential disclosure or to the use of that information
against the consenting party." Id. at 229. The consent therefore was no defense to Gulf's motion
for disqualification. See iz.
29. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 372.
30. No. CIV.A.96-5677, 1997 WL 330366. at *1(E.D. Pa. June 5, 1997).
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that a prospective waiver given in 1993 in a related but separate action
was not sufficient in a 1996 action?' The district court observed that
"It]he right to be fully informed about possible conflicts of interest
cannot be easily waived. '3 2 Similarly, in In re Suard Barge Services,
Inc.,3 the district court emphasized that any "'standing consent must by

necessity be exceedingly explicit' and cannot
arise merely from prior
3

failures to object to adverse representation."'
In Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 the district

court held that a six-year-old waiver was ineffective to constitute an
informed prospective consent to the current representation.36 In
Worldspan, the law firm offered its 1992 "'standard' engagement letter"
to show that plaintiffs in that matter prospectively gave the required

waiver of a conflict that ultimately arose in 1998."7 Nonetheless, the
plaintiff in Worldspan "strenuously objected" when informed that the
law firm had undertaken to represent the defendants.3 ' The court held
that the six-year-old waiver letter was insufficient, and stated that the
lapse of time since the waiver was signed "would seem to make it most

difficult for a consent that may have been thoroughly informed in 1992
to be informed in 1998." 39
B. ProspectiveWaivers and the Business Law Section
Ad Hoc Committee

But this careful attention to the rights of clients-protecting them
from all but the most carefully circumscribed prospective waivers-has

left the portion of the profession that wishes to expand their use

31. See id. at *2, *3, *6.
32. Id. at *6.
33. No. 96-3185, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12364, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1997).
34. Id. at *16 (citation omitted); see also Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Carey Can., Inc., 749
F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that the firm's standing consent was insufficient and
that such consent must be exceedingly explicit). Addressing a similarly vague waiver, the
bankruptcy court in In re Granite Partners, LP., 219 B.R. 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) stated the
following: "[B]oilerplate disclosure of prospective connections is rarely satisfactory." Id. at 36
(citing N.Y. County Law. Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 724 (1998)) (stating that "'If
the waiver is to be effective with respect to a future conflict, it must contemplate that particular
conflict with sufficient clarity so that the client's consent can reasonably be viewed as having been
fully informed when it was given"') (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 372 (1993)).
35. 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
36. See id. at 1358, 1360.
37. See id. at 1358.
38. See id.
39. Id.
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disgruntled, dissatisfied, and ornery. That dissatisfaction is vividly
reflected by what has occurred as the Ethics 2000 Commission of the
ABA ("Ethics 2000 Commission") has embarked on a comprehensive
review and revision of the Model Rules.' Among the many comments
the Ethics 2000 Commission received were a number of proposed
revisions from an ad hoe committee of the Business Law Section of the
ABA ("Ad Hoc Committee").4 Included in the Ad Hoc Committee's
package2 was a proposal regarding prospective waivers. "3
The Ad Hoc Committee began its presentation by artfully couching
the reason for the proposal in terms that sounded almost acceptable.
"[U]ncertainty concerning the [future] validity of prospective waivers
can prejudice other clients of the lawyer, depriving them of legal
services they expect to receive and their lawyer expects to be able to
render.'' Certainly, no one would want to be in favor of prejudice or to
dash expectations.
Despite its ambiguity, the Author assumes that what the Ad Hoe
Committee was identifying with this carefully crafted language is a
situation in which a law firm finds itself suddenly confronted with a
40. Ethics 2000 is the nickname of the ABA's latest Commission on the Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Ethics 2000 Commission") originally established at the Author's
suggestion by President-elect Jerome Shestack with the assistance of his predecessor, Lee COoper,
and successor, Philip Anderson. See generally Ethics 2000: Is the ABA Ready for the Next
Century?, Memorandum from Lawrence J. Fox, to Jerome Shestack (Feb. 24, 1997) ion file with
the Hofstra Law Review). The Ethics 2000 Commission is chaired by Chief Justice Norman
Veasey of the Supreme Court of Delaware, and has thirteen members: three judges, one former
judge who was also a law school dean, two professors of law, one former in-house counsel, one
former Department of Justice official, four practicing lawyers (including the Author), and one lay
person who is a former college president, head of the Aspen Institute, and business person %-ho
served while a member of the Ethics 2000 Commission as the non-executive Chairman of the
Board of the Central Broadcasting System. The Ethics 2000 Commission issued its first formal
report in November 2000. See Report of the Conmmission on Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, 2000 A.B.A. SEC. PROF'L RESp. iii [hereinafter Ethics 2000 Report]. For
more information on the Ethics 2000 Commission, including earlier drafts and all written
comments received by the Ethics 2000 Commission, see Ethics 2000 Project, American Bar
Association,
ABA
Network,
Center
for
Professional
Responsibility,
at
http:/wwwv..abanet.orglcpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
41. The membership of the ad hoc committee of the Business Law Section of the ABA (-Ad
Hoc Committee") is almost exclusively a distinguished group of major law firm partners t'.ho vicre
careful not to purport to write on behalf of the Business Law Section.
42. Two other proposals were to amend Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules") so as to permit screening and, therefore, bar imputation of conflicts
attributable to the side-switching lawyer, and to repeal imputation all together. See discussion
infra Part ILK.
43. See generally Letter from Larry Scriggins, Chair, Ad Hoe Committee on Ethics 2000, to
the ABA Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Sept. 15, 19991 (on
file with author).
44. d at 2.
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conflict between two present clients of the firm, since presumably only
present clients of the firm could ever have any "expectations" in this
regard. But how they would have such "expectations" and be prejudiced
by their failure to be met escapes the Author entirely. Rather, clients,
especially sophisticated clients, unless misled by their lawyers, should
have no such expectations; their expectations, to the contrary, should be
that, if the lawyer finds herself with two clients directly adverse to each
other, the lawyer would represent neither. Indeed, could there be
anything more unseemly than a lawyer, absent client consent, choosing
between two clients? Even if there were a right reason for making such
a choice, it defies belief to expect that, if lawyers were permitted to do
so they would make the choice between "two children" based on any
reason other than which client presented the more lucrative, high
powered, high visibility representation.
Similarly, it is impossible to imagine that any ethical lawyer would
have a legitimate "expectation" that he or she would be free to represent
one existing client against another. Certainly, both ethics codes
governing lawyers and case law teach precisely the opposite.45 Contrary
to the suggestion quoted above, lawyers' expectations, like clients'
expectations, should be that, when two present clients are directly
adverse, absent consent by either to the adverse representation by the
law firm against it by the other, the lawyer represents no one. The
lawyer is never free to drop one present client "like a hot potato" to
keep the representation of the other.46
One need not, in any event, spend much time on the impliedly
"sympathetic" limitation contained in the foregoing quote from the Ad
Hoc Committee presentation-this special consideration for "present"
clients taking positions directly adverse to other "present" clients from
whom prospective waivers have been extracted-because when the
proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee itself is reviewed, that limitation is
nowhere to be found. Rather, while wrapping itself in this teargenerating notion of the "prejudice" that would result by dashing
present client "expectations," the Ad Hoc Committee does not care one
iota whether the future conflict of interests that the prospective waiver is

45. The most fundamental proposition in the rules governing conflicts of interest is that,
absent consent, a lawyer "shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be
directly adverse to another client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7(a) (2001): see also
Hamson v. Fisons Corp., 819 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (explaining that ethical rules
governing lawyers in Florida prohibit a lawyer from representing a client whose interests are
directly adverse to another client).
46. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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said to waive are ones arising from another present client of the firm or
some client who picks up the telephone and seeks the lawyer's services
for the first time. Either one is equivalently waiveable in the totally
open-ended, undefined prospective waiver for which the Ad Hoc
Committee would like to make the ethics world safe. The proposal is
designed to "recognize the principle that sophisticated clients are
capable of giving informed general consents to future conflicts" and
"that the same principle should apply where the client is not necessarily
sophisticated in legal matters but is separately represented.'"7 As the
proposal is presented, it will, shockingly enough, "permit the lawyer
and client to enter into a binding agreement that neither could abrogate
under a 'second look' concept.'..
In particular, the Ad Hoc Committee proposed the following
comment with respect to prospective waivers which neither identify the
particular client nor the nature of the future adverse representation:
A client that has not retained a lawyer for general representation may
also agree to a waiver of future conflicts in other matters that are not
substantially related to those matters for which the client has retained
the lawyer. Whether a client who has given such a general waiver of
future conflicts with respect to unrelated matters will be deemed to
have given informed consent to a waiver of a specific type of conflict
within the meaning of paragraph (b) will depend upon evaluation of
such factors as the business sophistication of the client, the client's
familiarity with the nature of the lawyer's practice, the degree of
adversity involved (e.g., whether the waiver obtained referred to
litigation in a case where the lawyer later seeks to represent another
client in litigation with the client giving the waiver), and whether the
client was represented by independent counsel (either the General
Counsel, a member of the Law Department of the client, or outside
counsel) when the waiver was granted. Ordinarily,an advance waiver
given by a client who is independently represented by counsel in
connection with giving the waiver should be presumed to be an
informed consent.9
The proposed comment then gave its blessing to the permissibility of
securing a prospective waiver of the use by the lawyer of confidential
47. Letter from Larry Scriggins, Chair, Ad Hoc Committee on Ethics 2000, to the ABA
Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 43. at 2 (emphasis
added).
48. Id.Whatever can be said of the Ad Hoc Committee's ethics, there is no doubt its use of

Orwellian language wins high marks. Imagine abrogating a client's right to be sued by its own
lawyer. That would be a real sin.
49. Ld.
at 2-3 (emphasis added).
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information: "Consent to future use of client confidential information
will not be implied from the grant of a waiver of future conflicts unless
expressly agreed to by the client."'
Finally, the comment proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee
emphasized the "evergreen" nature of these general prospective
waivers, even to the point of providing that, if a client later wished to
escape the effect of a previously granted waiver, the lawyer would have
grounds to "fire" the client:
However, once a valid general waiver of future conflicts is obtained
from a client, it may be relied on by the lawyer so long as the lawyer
reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to continue to provide
competent and diligent representation to that client in those matters in
which the lawyer is performing legal services for that client,
notwithstanding the lawyer's representation of another client covered
by the conflict waiver. The client may revoke a waiver of future
conflicts, but the client may not withdraw its consent as to conflicts
arising prior to the revocation. In addition, the lawyer is entitled to
treat the revocation as a termination of the lawyer-client relationship,
with the effect that Rule 1.9 rather than Rule 1.7 would apply to
conflicts arising thereafter.5'
This proposal would eviscerate the ABA opinion in a number of
respects. First, it sets forth two standards for prospective waivers: one
for the sophisticated or represented and another for everyone else."
Second, while the opinion required the lawyer to identify both the likely
client, or class of clients, and the nature of the future matter, 3 this
proposal states the requirements in the disjunctive--"such as conflicts
with a particular client or conflicts involving a discrete practice area."'
Third, the proposed Ad Hoc Committee comment distinguishes between5
the prospective waiver of adverse transactional and litigation matters;"
however, either seems to be enforceable under this construct. Fourth,
the ABA opinion recognized that, when a prospective waiver is

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 372 (1993) (providing

that "[t]he closer the lawyer who seeks a prospective waiver can get to circumstances where not
only the actual adverse client but also the actual potential future dispute are identified" the greater

the likelihood that the waiver will be effective).
54. Letter from Larry Scriggins, Chair, Ad Hoc Committee on Ethics 2000, to the ABA
Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 43, at 2 (emphasis
added).
55. See id.
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executed, no one knows where the representation wll go, how long it
will last, what confidential information will be shared, how many
additional engagements will be undertaken by the firm, or when the law
firm will seek to enforce the prospective waiver. 5 Thus, the opinion
concluded that, almost certainly, a look back will be required at the time
the prospective waiver is dusted off,"' an essential ethical limitation that
is affirmatively eschewed by the Ad Hoc Committee proposal.5' Fifth,
the Ad Hoc Committee comment explicitly contemplates that the law
firm cannot only snare a prospective waiver of a conflict of interest, but
also a waiver of the use of confidential information, even though at the
time the waiver is secured, no one knows that confidential information
will be shared. 9 Sixth, if the client ever revokes this prospective waiver
of the protection of Rule 1.60 and Rule 1.7k of the Model Rules, the
lawyer may treat the revocation (apparently, even if based on
subsequent events in the representation) as a termination of the lawyerclient relationship. 2
C. ProspectiveWaivers and the Ethics 2000 Commission
While this proposal was not adopted in haec verba by the Ethics
2000 Commission, proposed comment 22 to Rule 1.7 unambiguously
rejects the learning of ABA Formal Opinion 372V and comes
surprisingly and distressingly close to the relief requested by the Ad
Hoc Committee.6 It begins innocently enough:
Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts
that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The
effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to
56.
57.
58.
59.

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 372.
See id.
See id.
See id. "Consent to future use of confidential information will not b. implied ... tnless

expressly agreed to by the client." Id. Nowhere is it explained how such consent could ever b

informed.
60. Model Rule 1.6 states that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to [thl
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation." MODEL RULES OF POF'L
CoNDucr R. 1.6(a) (2001).

61. Model Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client "if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless ... [the) client consents after
consultation." Id. R. 1.7(a).

62. See Letter from Larry Scriggins, Chair, Ad Hoe Committee on Ethics 2000, to the ABA
Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 43. at 3.

63. See Ethics 2000 Report, supranote 40, at 30-31.
64. See Letter from Larry Scriggins, Chair, Ad Hoe Committee on Ethics 200. to the ABA

Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 43, at 2.
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which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the
waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types
of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably
foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater
the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding.65
But then it adopts a surprising three-handed approach. On the one hand,
it provides: "[I]f the client agrees to consent to a particular type of
conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent
ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict."' On the
other hand, it observes: "If the consent is general and open-ended, then
the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably
likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved."6'
But then, on the third hand, the Ethics 2000 Commission's comment 22
proposal provides:
[I]f the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and
is reasonably informed regarding the risk that an unforeseeable
conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective,
particularly if the client is independently represented by other counsel
in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts
unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance
consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the
future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under
paragraph (b).6
Thus, believe it or not, the Ethics 2000 Commission actually proposes
that a prospective waiver presented to an "experienced" client might be
enforceable, not only as to totally unknown, unidentified, and
unanticipated future conflicts of interest, 69 but even as to a future
representation that is substantially related to a representation the law
firm has undertaken for the client from whom the prospective waiver
was extracted!70
One of the ironic aspects of the Ethics 2000 Commission's creation
of this yawning breach in the client protections provided by the Model
Rules is that this same Ethics 2000 Commission, in a related context,
65. Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 40, at 30-3 1.
66. Id. at 31.
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. See id.
70. See id. The use of the word "particularly" is particularly troubling because it admits that
the prospective waiver might be enforceable as to the experienced client, even if the client is not
represented and the waiver does not exclude substantially related matters.
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has taken a giant step toward enhancing the safeguards available to
clients when they are asked to waive conflicts of interest. To assure that
such consent is informed, the Ethics 2000 Commission has proposed as

an ethical mandate that the lawyer memorialize the client's consent in a
writing from the lawyer to the client." While this heightened sensitivity
for
cause
certainly
is
of clients
the
protection
to

celebration-particularly given the courage it took to recommend a rule
that will undoubtedly prove controversial among practitioners too long
accustomed to handling these pesky matters, if at all, in a desultory
telephone conversation-it seems almost impossible to reconcile this
enlightened approach with the Ethics 2000 Commission's expansive
laissez faire attitude toward prospective waivers and those who demand
them from their clients.
D. What Is Wrong with Prospective Waivers: Prospective Waivers
and Irfonned Consent

To understand the mischief of this prospective waiver approach,
one need only hold up to the harsh light of day the arguments offered by

the proponents of enforceable, open-ended prospective waivers. First, it
71. See id. at 181. Proposed comment 20 provides:
Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client.
confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client
or oral consent that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client. See Rule
1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (,,Titing includes electronic transmission). If it is not
feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent.
then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. The
requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk
with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened
with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the
client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise
questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients
the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes
or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. The writing need not
take any particular form; it should, however, include disclosure of the relevant
circumstances and reasonably foreseeable risks of the conflict of interest, as well as the
client's agreement to the representation despite such risks.
lI (underscoring omitted). In adopting this proposal the Ethics 2000 Commission was following
the lead of California. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L Co,\',oLcr R. 3-310(C). (E) (2000) (requiring
attorneys to obtain informed written consent from clients in specified situations before accepting
representation). Consider, for example, how the Reporter's Explanation of Changes justifies thz
Ethics 2000 Commission's proposal that the standard be changed from "consent after
consultation" to "informed consent." See Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 40, at 134. It is said that
the old standard of "consultation" "does not sufficiently indicate the extent to w'hich clients must
be given adequate information and explanation in order to make reasonably informed decisions."
Id. at 135.
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is asserted that experienced clients are better informed.72 Well, just think
about it. What kind of an experience would experienced clients have to
possess to be better informed about something they do not know
anything about? Are we saying that people who are experienced or
sophisticated have clairvoyance? Do they know where the
representation will go? Do they know whether any additional
representations are going to be added? Do they know what confidential
information they are going to share? Do they know what that
confidential information is? Do they know when the waiver is going to
be used? Do they know who the adverse clients are and what the new
matters they are now waiving will be?
It does not matter how smart a client is, how experienced a client
is, how sophisticated a client is, how many lawyers a client has
representing him or her, for how many years he or she has hired
lawyers, or how many lawyers he or she has hired. It makes no
difference. Clients do not know anything about this prospective waiver
except that they are informed that they are not informed.73 And so, the
requirement of informed consent, so strenuously supported by requiring
a confirmatory writing, disappears entirely when it comes to prospective
waivers snatched from experienced clients.
E. Prospective Waivers and Client Autonomy
Second, the proponents of prospective waivers point out that, if the
client does not wish to accept the prospective waiver when it is first
tendered, the client can simply choose another law firm. 74 While this
sounds like a reasonable proposition at first blush, further consideration
reveals the two great flaws in this justification. Some of those from
whom prospective waivers are demanded will be existing clients of the
law firm. When the client asks its present firm to take on a new matter,
a prospective waiver will be demanded. When asked whether the client
wishes the law firm to take the assignment, the client has no choice but
to acquiesce in this new ordering of the lawyer-client arrangement,
since the client will have to consider that he or she has used this firm for
years and that moving his or her work to another firm would work its
72. See Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 40, at 31 (explaining that open-ended consent is
generally not effective, unless the client is "an experienced user of the legal services involved and
is reasonably informed regarding the risk that an unforeseeable conflict may arise").
73. For a reminder of how important information is, see infra note 75.
74. See Nora J. Pasman, The Conflict of "Conflict of Interest": The Michigan Example, 1995
D'r. C.L. REV. 133, 173-74 (asserting that "citizens have ample choice of counsel without being
burdened with one whose loyalties may or should lie elsewhere").
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own hardship. Therefore, the client will feel that he or she has anything
but a "cost free" choice in deciding whether to accept the prospective
waiver ultimatum.
More importantly, when one looks at the issue of prospective
waivers from the macro-economic perspective of the legal business, one
can easily envision client choice becoming, over time, a hollow
promise. After all, seeking prospective waivers can hardly make
lawyers feel more ethical or better about themselves. The very notion of
telling a brand new client, let alone an old one, whose trust, confidence,
and respect the lawyer wishes to develop or maintain, that he or she
wants the client in advance to permit his or her law firm to take on
matters directly adverse to the client at some future date must diminish
the lawyer who makes this unsavory request in some significant way.
Thus, the only reason to traverse this uncomfortable terrain is to
enhance the economics of the law firm. Every conflict a law firm never
has to confront is just that much more revenue for the enterprise.
But, if some firms start using these prospective waivers wholesale,
it will not be long before these firms find themselves doing much better
financially. As the starting salaries, profits per partner, or revenues per
lawyer of these firms start to soar, the traditional firms, wedded to old
notions of loyalty, will look at these other firms, not so encumbered,
and conclude that the only way for them to compete is also to launch a
campaign of demanding prospective waivers. Thus, with no rules
prohibiting these waivers, the profession will be treated to an inevitable
and ugly race to the bottom as, one by one, these firms recognize that
the only way to remain competitive is to join the crowd, where the
leaders are those who successfully demand the most and most farreaching prospective waivers from the most clients.
F. ProspectiveWaivers and Lawyers Choosing
Between Clients
Third, one might seek to minimize the downside of prospective
waivers by asserting that, just because law firms have snared
prospective waivers, they will not always employ them. While it is true
that some prospective waivers, even under the Ethics 2000 Commission
formulation, may not be enforceable, 7 the important point to recognize

75. The Ethics 2000 Commission comment concludes: "In any case, advance co"ent cannot
be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict
nonconsentable under paragraph (b)." Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 40, at 31. But, once
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here is that, as the law firm faces the crossroads of whether to rely upon
a prospective waiver, its decision is likely to turn on anything but
considerations of which the firm can be proud.
Suppose the firm possesses a prospective waiver, secured five
years ago from an experienced client, sitting in the firm's hip pocket.
Now the firm is presented with a conflicting representation that the
prospective waiver can overcome. Instead of the firm deciding how to
proceed based on considerations of professional responsibility and
loyalty, the firm will now engage in a new analysis: Which
representation offers the bigger bucks? Which client is likely to offer
the most opportunity to cross-sell and generate more revenue in the
future? Which client is likely to open more doors for the firm? And
undiscussed, but definitely considered, will be questions relating to the
relative power of the partners, offices, and practice areas of the firm that
are involved in the two competing opportunities.76 Finally, overarching
everything else will be an attempt to determine the likelihood that the
old client will fire the firm if the firm insists on relying upon the
prospective waiver to take on the new matter.
Just contemplating these unseemly discussions provides one with a
high level of discomfort and unease. Yet, if the prospective waiver
proposal were adopted, the profession would have gone beyond
condemning to encouraging precisely this kind of decision-making
process.
G. Firingthe Lawyer as Client Protection
The proponents of prospective waivers raise a fourth argument in
their favor: the "safety valve" of client protection that may be found in
the freedom of the client to fire the lawyer at the time the client learns
its firm is about to take a position directly adverse to the client on behalf
of another client, whose identity, matter, and circumstances were never
identified in a prospective waiver.* Now, why lawyers would ever, as a
proposed comment 22 is adopted, how long that limitation will last is open to question. See infra
text accompanying notes 93-94.
76. Dean Dan R. Fischel of the great University of Chicago Law School has addressed the
paradigm of the little client of a minor partner in a branch office that gives credit to the truth of
this assumption. In a recent article, Professor Fisehel argued that it was "draconian" to allow a
"small matter" for a "subsidiary" accepted by a "junior partner" in a Washington firm's "Los
Angeles office" to block another representation against the "parent," presumably by a senior
partner in the headquarters office. See Daniel R. Fischel, MultidisciplinaryPractice,55 BUs, LAW.
951, 965 (2000).
77. See, e.g., Pasman, supra note 74, at 173-74 (suggesting that a client may fire a lawyer
whose loyalties lie elsewhere); Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing
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profession, get themselves into the business of encouraging clients to
fire lawyers is beyond reason. But lawyers should recognize that even
making that argument suggests that the client will have "freedom" that
the client, in reality, may not have.
Firing is not always available as a remedy for the client. The client
may be about to go to trial. The client may be engaged in a short
deadline transaction. The client may have invested thousands, tens of
thousands of dollars, in getting the law firm up to speed and may not
want to switch law firms. The client may actually like his or her lawyer.
The lawyer and the client may have developed a rapport, even a sense of
trust. So, there are many reasons why clients may not want to go around
firing their lawyers.
And do lawyers, as a profession, really want to put clients in the
position where the only way they can protect their loyalty interests is by
switching lawyers? When it is also recognized that the client could well
be forced to retain another law firm that will present the client with yet
another prospective waiver, it is easy to imagine how this problem can
cascade out of hand.
Another great irony that should not be lost is that the Ethics 2000
Commission's proposed prospective waiver comment actually
contemplates treating present clients of the firm worse than the rules
currently treat former clients. As to a former client, Rule 1.9 of the
Model Rules provides that a lawyer cannot take on a matter materially
adverse to a former client that is substantially related to the work the
lawyer did for that former client." But, under proposed comment 22, a
prospective waiver that contemplates taking on a matter substantially
related to the work the lawyer is currently undertaking for the client
apparently could pass ethical muster.' This is very bad ethics and
reflects no client loyalty.

Members of CorporateFamilies,72 NOTRE DA%E L. REv. 655. 674 (1997) (noting that if a client

"is offended that the law firm is representing another client in a matter adverse to the[i] interests
... the offended client can always end its retention and terminate the lawyer").

78. Forcing clients to "fire" lawyers to achieve loyalty from their counsel is just as invidious
as lawyers "firing" clients to take on a new, better, and conflicting representation, a practice that
has been uniformly condemned by the courts. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco. Inc.. 646
F.2d 1339, 1345 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981); Picker Int'l. Inc. v. Varian Assoes. Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1363.
1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LVm, GOVEtING LWYERs § 132 cmt. C

(2000).
79. See MIODEL RULEs OFPROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.9(a) (2001).
80. See Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 40, at 182.
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H. Prospective Waivers and PublicPolicy
Ethics rules governing lawyers, by and large, are designed to
protect clients. Indeed, without that raison d'9tre, there would be little
cause to have a code or even to call the law a profession. Nonetheless,
some of the ethics rules quite properly reflect the balancing of
competing interests. For example, if the legal profession were to adopt a
rule governing confidentiality that was entirely client-centered, the rule
would contain no exceptions to the obligation of a lawyer to keep his or
her client's secrets. The rules that have been adopted, however, though
hardly uniform,' reflect the judgment of different jurisdictions as to
how to strike a balance between the client's interest that what takes
place in the privacy of the lawyer-client relationship remains
sacrosanct,' with society's and, perhaps, the lawyer's interest in
preventing imminent death," serious bodily injury, 4 perjury before a
tribunal,"5 and, in many states, client crimes or fraud 6 that may result in
substantial financial injury, particularly if the lawyer's services have
been employed in the client misdeeds.
Similarly, if one were designing an entirely client-centered loyalty
rule one would say that a lawyer never could take a representation
adverse to a former client. The rules that have been adopted, however,
balance that interest against the interest of lawyers not being forced to
retire by age forty and, therefore, they limit prohibited representations
against former clients to those that are substantially related to the earlier
representation" or representations
information of the former client. 9 that involve the use of confidential

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
provides:

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 cmt. b (2000).
See id.
See id. § 66(1).
See id.
See id. § 63 cmt. a.
See id. § 67(1)(a).
See id. § 67(I)(d).
See, e.g., MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.9(a) (2001). Model Rule 1.9(a)

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client consents after consultation.
Id.
89. See, e.g., id. R. 1.9(c)(1). Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter.., shall not thereafter
... use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or
when the information has become generally known ....
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Yet, when one considers prospective waivers, there is no similar
legitimate lawyer interest to enter into the balance. Other than adding to
law firm wealth, one cannot conjure a single lawyer interest that
justifies a device that is clearly designed to significantly compromise
the loyalty interests of the client, one that would permit a lawyer to take
a position directly adverse to the client on a matter never identified at
the time the "informed" waiver is received.
L

Should ConsentingAdults Receive Only the Ethics
They Can Negotiate?

While the Author trusts that the foregoing places a fatal stake in the
heart of undefined prospective waivers, even as presented to
experienced clients, the real threat presented by this proposal is much
more dangerous than whether clients will be forced to acquiesce to
unethical, unanticipated adverse future representations. Rather, it
introduces the concept of "the consenting adult exception" that
abandons the minimum standards that ethics rules have always provided
for all clients, regardless of their station in life." Whether a lawyer was
dealing with General Motors or Grandma Tilley, both were entitled to
competent representation, confidentiality, loyalty, professional
independence, and a myriad of other important obligations and
protections. While the legal profession has long recognized that a
lawyer might not have to explain as fully to the knowledgeable client
what the lawyer was doing, what the clients options were, or why the
client might want to consent, for example, to a confidential disclosure or
to a conflict, the base-line protections were identical for each.9 ' But
now, with proposed comment 22, the legal profession treads down a
new pathway, one the profession should avoid at all costs, for reasons
the Author hopes to articulate with all the fervor he can muster.
First, all experienced or sophisticated clients are anything but
powerful and knowledgeable. Any practicing lawyer, even those at
high-powered law firms, has encountered many clients, long-time
clients, clients who are voracious users of legal services, clients who are
titans of industry who nonetheless remain vulnerable and without
bargaining power in their relationship with counsel. How many times
Ia
90. CompareEthics 2000 Report, supra note 40, at 31 (distinguishing betw een cxFparienccd
and inexperienced clients), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CO DuCT R. 1.7 (demonstrating a lazck

of distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated clients).
91. See MODEL RuLES OFPROF'LCONDUCrR. 1.7.
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have lawyers seen chief executive officer bravado so brazenly exercised
within the corporate enterprise disappear when the latest threat to
corporate prosperity arises in the legal arena? Often, these clients view
"the law" as the ultimate black box and gratefully switch from being
independent warriors to accepting a dependent relationship with their
lawyer; indeed, a lawyer's professional stock in trade is to encourage
trust among clients that will make clients feel comfortable reposing
these matters with lawyers. Lawyers should not be in the business of
being obliged to warn clients that one of the things they should be alert
to is possible (even likely) overreaching by their own lawyer.
Second, adding in-house counsel to the equation does not
necessarily tip the balance. The proponents of this experienced client
notion might have the General Counsel of General Motors in mind; yet,
so often, in-house counsel, even in-house counsel for Fortune 100
companies, are unsophisticated, young, and inexperienced. In addition,
there are thousands of smaller businesses that are represented by inhouse counsel, or even outside counsel, in their hiring of powerhouse
firms, where that counsel's presence does not right the power or
information imbalance between lawyer and client that the rules correctly
assume.
Third, should the legal profession encourage a system in which the
determination of whether the lawyer complied with the ethical mandates
turns on after-the-fact litigation over whether the client (with or without
his or her lawyer) fell into that category of the experienced or
sophisticated client such that the lawyer was free to escape the effect of
the rules? The process of adjudicating this question would not only be
standardless and unseemly ("are too," "are not"), but it also would not
provide the pre-representation, pre-decision-making certainty the rules
should foster when discussing ethical protections for clients.
Fourth, some might recognize the problems with prospective
waivers but post the simple question: "Is there anything wrong with the
lawyer simply asking? After all, the client can always say 'no."' But
that answer simply is not correct and only emphasizes how out of touch
those lawyers are with how things look from the client's side. It is far
more likely that the client will think: "If my lawyer wants this favor, I
guess I should give it to him. The last thing I want to do is anything that
will dim his ardor for my cause," than for the client to really feel "free"
to go either way. And, as the following discussion demonstrates, even if
the client feels comfortable resisting the request, the act of asking taints
not only the lawyer doing the asking, but, in the Author's view, the
profession as a whole.
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss3/1
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This discussion reveals a far more fundamental issue. Does the
legal profession really want its ethical rules to be waiveable to the
extent that they are won or lost in a battle between a concededly highpowered client and a high-powered lawyer? Does the legal profession
want the ethical protections that are to be provided to the client to turn
on the number of protections the lawyer is able to avoid in a free market
free-for-all in which each engagement starts at an ethical ground zero?
Will the legal profession's rules ever be entitled to be associated with
the words "ethics" or "professional responsibility" if the process by
which they are established represents something not unlike the give and
take over "representations and warranties" between a buyer and a seller
in a commercial transaction? Does the legal profession want the "rules
of engagement" literally to be decided in this preliminary skirmishing
between lawyer and client? Is that where the legal profession wishes
client protections to devolve?
J. Is Everything Open to Negotiation?
Thinking about the other "opportunities" that the abandonment of
minimum standards for lawyers might provide demonstrates the
mischievous seeds that are planted by this proposed comment 22. A
little tour of the rules provides an opportunity to think about how many
more of them the legal profession would be prepared to abandon if a
motivated lawyer were able to squeeze consents from her experienced
clients, if the tendered retainer letter did not just contain a prospective
conflict waiver clause, but was a lengthy single-spaced document
designed to snare as many waivers as Avis tries to collect when the busy
lawyer signs a rental car contract at LaGuardia.
Start with non-waiveable conflicts. Included in that concept are
directly adverse representations before tribunalss and any other
representation in which it is unreasonable for the lawyer to conclude
that the conflict will not have a materially adverse effect on the
representation. 9 Can the legal profession abandon that requirement if it
92. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNI NG Lkn'ErTs § 122 cmt. goiiiI
(providing examples of cases in which courts have held that the lawyer cannot represent directly
adverse parties in the same lawsuit).

93. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CoDtmCr R. l.(a)(l), (b) l). The exact formulation
is that a lawyer cannot represent a client unless the lawyer reasonably blieves that representation
of the client "will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client" or that representation
of the client "will not be adversely affected" by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client. Id.
The comment to the rule is helpful:

A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. Howvaeer, as
indicated in paragraph (a)(1) with respect to representation directly adverse to a client.
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secures the consent of an experienced client? If that same client can be

asked to consent to a conflict not yet even identified, it is hardly an
ethical leap to conclude that the client can also be asked to consent to
one that is identified, but non-waiveable. After all, those who are being
asked are experienced.

Confidentiality may be another fertile area for abandoning
minimum standards in our ethics rules. Those who wish to amend
Model Rule 1.6 governing confidentiality argue that a change is
necessary to protect lawyers.' If a lawyer's services have been
employed innocently in the client's commission of a crime or fraud, the
proponents of this change argue that the lawyer should be free to
disclose confidential information to prevent, mitigate, or rectify the

damages flowing therefrom." This, in turn, raises the question in
jurisdictions in which this amendment has not yet been adopted,"
whether lawyers, nonetheless, should be able to gain prospective
permission from the client to disclose that which is prohibited by the
rule, so long as the retainer agreement is signed by an experienced

client. Even though the client at the time of the waiver has no idea what
confidential information will be shared in the future, if the experienced
client understands that he or she is waiving these protections, the

reasoning behind the proposed prospective waiver comment certainly
supports the proposition that such an additional waiver should also be
permitted.
Lawyers are prohibited from charging unreasonable feesY This

rule applies with equal force to Microsoft and Uncle Milt. But should it?

and paragraph (b)(1) with respect to material limitations on representation of a client,
when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the
representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent.
Id. cmt. 5.
94. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 91-93 (Supp.
1989) (explaining proposals by the Kutak Commission that would revise Model Rule 1.6 and
expand circumstances under which a lawyer may disclose client confidences).
95. See id. at91-93, 109-110.
96. For example, Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Rhode Island, and Washington
prohibit such disclosure. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1996); ARIZ. RULES OF
PROF'L CoNDuCr ER 1.6 (1985); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1997); FLA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6 (1994); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1999); WASH. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2000).
97. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a). Model Rule 1.5(a) provides:
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following:
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If an experienced client agrees to a fee, should not that client be "stuck"
with the resulting arrangement? Two theories might support this
exception to the prohibition of Rule 1.5: (1) Any agreement entered into
by an experienced client is per se reasonable or (2) A waiver by the
experienced client of the protections of this rule in a retainer
agreement-before the client knows what fee will be charged-is
enforceable just like the prospective waiver of unknown client conflicts.
The securing of such a waiver would provide counsel with a wonderful
level of confidence and certainty that the fee agreement will be fully
enforceable. But then dare one ask whether that is an important enough
achievement to permit lawyers to avoid the requirements of Rule 1.5 as
to experienced clients.
If one goes that far, why stop the campaign to promote lawyer
peace of mind at this point? Ethics rules governing lawyers provide that
a lawyer may not seek a waiver of unlimited malpractice liability,
unless the agreement is permitted by law and the client is advised in
writing of the advisability of being separately represented by another
lawyer. 3 However, proposed comment 22 suggests that this rule's
waiver requirements are far too strict." Certainly, the experienced client
should be free to give her lawyer an opportunity to reduce his or her
malpractice premiums by waiving malpractice liability in the retainer
agreement, regardless of the rule's protective requirements. An effective
law firm, armed with enough of these waivers, might decide it could
forego malpractice insurance altogether.
The recent trend of lawyers' accepting'" or even insisting ' on the
client paying some or all of the fee for professional services in shares of
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawryer.

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services:
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client:

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Id.
98. See, e.g., i.L

I.8)

("A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting tha

lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement....").
99. See Ethics 2000 Report, supranote 40. at 182.
100. See Debra Baker, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?:Lav FirsInvesting in Hot High.
Tech IPOs Are Making a Fortune, but Some Critics Worr' the Stock Craze Is Clouding Ethics
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the client raises issues under Rule 1.8(a) of the Model Rules, the rule

governing business transactions with a client.' Rule 1.8(a) requires the
lawyer to give the client an opportunity to disclose the terms of the

proposed transaction in writing in a manner the client can understand,
subjects the lawyer to an objective review of the transaction for entire
fairness at a later date, and mandates client consent to the transaction in

writing."
If the value of the stock received as a fee soars after the initial

public offering, the law firm runs the risk of its fee being viewed as an
unreasonable one, or as a business transaction with the client that lacks
entire fairness.0 4 But, if ethics rules permit lawyers to seek waivers of
these protections before commencement of representation in which

compensation will be the payment of stock, then those lawyers would
not have to worry whether the stock-for-fee arrangement would pass
ethical muster. Again, peace of mind for lawyers would be promoted,
admittedly at the expense of their experienced clients; but, that is
certainly a tolerable expense about which one can now be confidently

Matters, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 36, 37-40 (discussing reasons for and implications of attorneys
accepting stock in lieu of traditional cash fees).
101. See Richard B. Schmitt, Little Law Firm Scores Big by Taking Stake in Clients:
Specializing in Web Start-Ups, Venture Law Group Turns Its Back on CorporateStars, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 22, 2000, at BI (stating that the Venture Law Group "insists on having an opportunity to
buy in ... at the idea stage").
102. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 418 (2000)
(concluding that "a lawyer who acquires stock in her client corporation in lieu of or in addition to
a cash fee for her services enters into a business transaction with a client, such that the
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a) must be satisfied"); ABA Section of Litigation, Task Force on
the Independent Lawyer; Lawyers Doing Business with Clients: Identifying and Avoiding Legal
and Ethical Dangers (2000).
103. See MODEL RuLES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a). Rule 1.8(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a
client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in
a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id. The Ethics 2000 Commission would make these requirements stronger, requiring that the client
be advised of all of this in a writing signed by the client. See Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 40, at
205.
104. See Passante v. McWilliam, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 298, 299 (Ct. App. 1997) (affirming the
trial court's holding that if the attorney bargained for a client's promise to pay attorney's fees with
stock, the promise was obtained in violation of the attorney's ethical obligations),
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unconcerned, since these clients, as one learns from proposed comment
22, obviously can protect themselves."
Permitting an erosion of the protections offered by the rules as to
experienced clients need not stop with important aspects of the lawyerclient relationship. Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules prohibits lawyers from
contacting represented persons-all represented persons-without the
permission of the person's lawyer."" Applying the lessons of this
discussion, that rule can be viewed as so paternalistic. What experienced
client does not understand the threat posed by opposing counsel and
does not possess the wherewithal to resist any overreaching approach
the adverse lawyer might undertake? Surely, if one follows the
reasoning of proposed comment 22, the protections of Rule 4.2 need not
remain in place for experienced clients; those parties who wish their
lawyer to get around the officious intermeddling of the other side's
counsel ought to be free, through counsel, to make a direct approach to
a represented person who is experienced in such matters."' Our friends
at the Department of Justice, for sure, will dance with glee when they
learn that, finally, the impediment to "the legitimate needs of law
enforcement" posed by Rule 4.2 can be obviated-at least as to
experienced clients, particularly those directors, officers, and key
employees of miscreant corporations and other organizations with
whom the Department of Justice lawyers are so determined to chat.
Finally, many jurisdictions have enacted ethical rules prohibiting
sex with clients.S The Ethics 2000 Commission has offered a similar

proposal."°9 The impetus for the rule is the overreaching that can occur
in the relationship between a powerful lawyer and a vulnerable client.
As the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed comment to its "no sex with
clients" rule observes: "The relationship between lawyer and client ...
is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship ... can involve
unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role. .. ."" But does one

really need this rule to protect experienced clients when the relationship
105. See Ethics 2000 Report,supra note 40, at 182.
106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (prohibiting all contact betcen law)cr
and represented client "unless the lawyer has the consent of the other law) ce").
107. See Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 40, at 182.
108. See, e.g., FLA. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-8A(i) (1998); MN;. RILEs OF PQFo'L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(k) (1997); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (1997); UT,t RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (2000); v. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8A(g) (1999); 'NIS.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT SCR 20:1.8(k)(2) (1998).
109. See Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 40. at 198-99 ("A lawyer shall not have sexual
relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed betwyeen them %,,henthe
client-lawiyer relationship commenced.") (underscoring omitted).
110. Idat41.
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is "equal?" Proposed comment 22 more than suggests the answer is
"no.'" The Author, of course, will resist the temptation to ask at what
these clients, whom the proposed rule is going to exempt from the
protection of the "no sex with clients" rule, must be experienced."'
K. The Real Goal: Abolish Imputation
The proposal to permit prospective waivers not only reflects an
opening wedge in a campaign to water down ethical rules for
experienced clients, but also a frontal assault on imputation. The Author
has asserted elsewhere that imputation is the foundation stone of the
legal profession's commitment to the core value of loyalty to clients."'
Imputation holds that all lawyers within a given practice setting carry
with them the obligation to uphold the loyalty interests of the clients of
every other lawyer in the practice setting. ' 4 If any lawyer in the firm or
law office is representing A, then no one else in the firm can take on a
matter adverse to A, without A's informed consent."5
The result of this rule is that firms must recognize many conflicts
and, as a result, turn down a great deal of business. A good size law firm
could operate on the matters the ethics committee-also known as the
"no business" committee at Drinker Biddle & Reath-rejects each year.
This rule on imputation also means that firms must maintain these huge
databases, circulate conflicts memoranda to all lawyers, and maintain a
time consuming and expensive infrastructure to keep the firm on the
straight and narrow ethical path. Think how many more hours lawyers
could dedicate to billable endeavors if they were not required to address
these conflicts, to say nothing of how much more business the firm
could keep if it could escape the annoying clutches of this conflictgenerating rule. In this day, when law firms operate in ten or more cities
and partners have never even met, let alone know each other, the
argument is advanced why a lawyer in the Miami office should keep his
111. Seeid. at182.
112. This discussion just addresses some of the many examples one can find in the Model
Rules. The reader might wish to consider others. Ethics rules governing competence (Rule 1.1),
scope (Rule 1.2), and diligence (Rule 1.3) come to mind, but there could be more. See generally
MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCoNDUCrR. 1.1 to 1.3 (2001).
113. See Lawrence J. Fox, Dan's World: A Free EnterpriseDream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55
BUS. LAW. 1533, 1542, 1557-58 (2000).
114. See id. at 1542-43.
115. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.10(a). Model Rule 1.10(a) provides:
"While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any
one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2."
Id.
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partner in Philadelphia from taking on an intriguing and lucrative matter
in Boston.

To correct this "unfortunate" situation, the aforementioned Ad Hoe
Committee has added to its suggestion that the Ethics 2000 Commission

endorse and enforce open-ended prospective waivers wrenched from
experienced clients, the frontal abandonment of imputation altogether. " '

This latter proposal is so breathtaking in its scope that it really obviates
the need for the former proposal altogether. What the Ad Hoe

Committee seeks is the adoption by the Ethics 2000 Commission of a
rule that would permit a lawyer to take on a new matter directly adverse
to a present client, the only caveat being that the new matter not be
substantially related to the matter or matters currently being handled on
behalf of the present client.17 Only Wild West Texas has adopted such a

swashbuckling rule,"' and even there a federal court has found its attack
116. See Letter from the Business Law Section Ad Hoe Committee on Ethics 2000, to the
American Bar Association, Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 4
(Oct. 5, 1999). The Author guesses that one cannot expect much from folks %vhocan unashamntdly
write "[t]he general rule of imputation... unnecessarily ignores the interests ofclients!' Id.
117. See idThe full proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee for amending Rule 1.10 reads:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent
a client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that any one of them
practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 17(a). 1.8(c). or 1.9 or
2.2, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and
does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client
by the remaining lawyers in the firm except as permitted in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(b) If the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and
does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client,
any of the remaining lawyers in the firm may represent the client.
(c)The provisions of paragraph (a) shall not be applicable to conflicts arising under
either Rule 1.7 or 1.9 if(1) The prohibited lawyer is screened from any contact with the new matter in
accordance with paragraph (f);
(2) the lawyer undertaking the new matter is screened from any contact with any
disqualifying matter in accordance with paragraph (f);
(3) any disqualifying matter and the new matter are not the same or substantially
related;
(4) there is no significant risk of a diminution of the obligation of loyalty by a
lawyer of the firm to its clients; and
(5) in the case of conflicts arising under Rule 1.7, each affected client is advised
in writing of the circumstances warranting the implementation of screening
procedures and of the actions taken to comply with this rule.
Id
118. See TEx. RuLEs oFPROF'L CONDUCTR.l.06(b)(l) (2000). Rule 1.06 provides in pan:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent opposing parties to the same litigation.
(b) In other situations and except to the extent permitted by paragraph (cl. a lawyer
shall not represent a person if the representation of that person:

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:701

on client loyalty too much to stomach.'1 9 But, that is what the Ad Hoc
Committee asks and, to support the idea, it actually has the temerity to
suggest that the new rule would maintain "undivided and undiminished
loyalty" to the client because, in the world of the Ad Hoc Committee,
the lawyers "actually serving" this present client would be screened
from the other lawyers in the firm working simultaneously on the
matters adverse to the client.'20
In presenting this proposal, the Ad Hoc Committee is simply

echoing sentiments expressed by others. Right here at the Hofstra
University School of Law, I recall Sheila Birnbaum, the great products
liability lawyer from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP,
asserted that she should be free to take on a matter directly adverse to
clients of her firm's Hong Kong office, since she did not even know the

Skadden lawyers in the Hong Kong office; though she was not as quick
to give up sharing in the revenues from the office.'

Similarly the great

Dean of the University of Chicago School of Law, Dan R. Fischel, has
argued in the Business Lawyer, a publication of the same ABA section
that has organized the Ad Hoc Committee, that imputation is "obsolete"
and "should be discarded" altogether, since it simply serves as an

impediment to law firms "grow[ing] to their efficient size""' when
unimpeded by the rule. This approach to conflicts-no imputation-is
the model already adopted by the Big 5 accounting firms," which in

fact has permitted those enterprises to become behemoths. For the Big
5, there are no non-waiveable conflicts, and all conflicts are personal to

(1) involves a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are
materially and directly adverse to the interests of another client of the lawyer or
the lawyer's firm; and
(2) reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited by the lawyer's or law
firm's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's or
law firm's own interests.
Id. R. 1.06(a), (b).
119. See, e.g., In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 619 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
ethical prohibitions against successive representations cannot be enforced merely by requiring
protection of client confidences to the extent necessary to prevent "'taint[ing]' the trial with their
adverse use).
120. See Letter from the Business Law Section Ad Hoc Committee on Ethics 2000, supra
note 116, at 4. Meanwhile, unstated, is the fact that all lawyers, screened and unscreened, would
happily enjoy all of the fees generated by these conflicting representations.
121. Ms. Birnbaum's remarks, though unrecorded, were presented at Hofstra University
School of Law on March 11, 1996, during a conference entitled Legal Ethics: The Core Issues.
122. Fischel, supra note 76, at 966.
123. See Sam DiPiazza, Jr., Remarks Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice,
American Bar Association, ABA Network, Center for Professional Responsibility (Mar. 11, 1999),
at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/dipiazza.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2000).
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the individuals working on the engagement, with each professional
being judged by a totally subjective standard of whether each feels
comfortable providing services to any given client.14
This proposed abandonment of imputation reflects the potential
effects of open-ended, undefined, non-abrogateable prospective
waivers, but on a far larger scale. The successful securing of a
prospective waiver from a client means that the law firm does not have
to impute any conflicts that an individual client might generate to any of
the other lawyers in the firm, at least as to matters not substantially
related to work being done on that client's behalf. Thus, prospective
waivers produce abandonment of imputation one client at a time.
From the Ad Hoc Committee's perspective, a wholesale adoption
of its amendment to Rule 1.10 would be ideal. But, if the Ad Hoc
Committee can simply garner permission for open-ended prospective
waivers that never have to be revisited at a later date, it would have
achieved a major victory, giving the Ad Hoc Committee just the
incentive it needs to return to the battle for the purpose of ending
imputation altogether on yet another day.
I.

CONCLUSION

So it all starts with one small comment buried in the lengthy
comments annexed to proposed new Model Rule 1.7. And maybe, even
if adopted, it will not go beyond its bounds. But do not count on it. The
path to victory for the forces of economic hegemony over professional
responsibility is already well marked by its most ferocious proponents.
Proposed comment 22 is just one milepost along the way. And when we
get there, heaven forefend, it will then be used as a precedent to
accelerate the profession along a route whose end-point is something
that looks remarkably like where the Big 5 reside today. So, now is the
time to raise the alarm, launch the counter-attack, recommit ourselves to
our professional values, and defend the role of ethical lawyers-inspired
by that conscience of our profession, the Lichtenstein Professor of
Ethics, my good friend and hero, Monroe H. Freedman.

124. See id
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